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This paper investigates the role of corporate taxation with respect to a multinational's
investment decision, in which the multinational can pursue either a direct or an indirect
investment strategy. The latter involves at least three corporate entities and opens up
enhanced opportunities for international tax planning. The existence of preferential tax
treatment for conduit or intermediate corporate entities presumably changes the role of
corporate taxation in destination countries, because it supports multinationals in avoiding
taxes. The empirical ¯ndings of this study are consistent with theoretical predictions and
suggest that tax e®ects di®er, depending on the investment regime. The endogeneity of the
structural choice|direct versus indirect|is taken into account by a switching regression
approach.
Keywords: multinational company, business taxes, ¯rm-level data, switching regression
JEL Classi¯cation: H25, F23Non technical summary 
 
This study investigates how taxes affect the affiliate-level investment decision of German 
multinationals, taking into account that a significant share of outbound investments are 
indirect rather than direct. While we consider direct investments as simple bilateral structures 
(a parent firm investing in a foreign affiliate), indirect strategies involve at least three 
companies, where the parent is investing via a conduit or intermediate entity in another 
foreign enterprise. Indirect investment structures possibly open up enhanced opportunities for 
multinationals to avoid taxes, and hence, presumably change the role of corporate taxation in 
destination countries. 
 
A theoretical model, distinguishing between direct and indirect structures, yields different 
corporate tax effects, depending on the respective regime. The empirical analysis, based on 
the MiDi data of the Bundesbank, follows the theoretical model and empirically confirms our 
expectations. If we consider tax wedges we obtain from the theoretical analysis, we find 
adverse effects on affiliate-level investment for both regimes. The empirical results, where we 
take into account the endogeneity of the regime choice (direct versus indirect) by a switching 
regression approach, suggest that an increase in the cost of capital reduces indirect 
investments more than direct effects. 
 
The findings suggest also that income can be transferred to the German parent without tax 
deduction, implying that multinationals actually exploit indirect investment structures to avoid 
taxes. This may imply that the existence of conduit structures and low-tax conduit countries 
reduces the downward pressure on tax rates. However, since tax competition is a phenomenon 
which is not confined to one specific aspect, tax competition for intermediate entities may 
well be intensified. 
 Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Investitionstätigkeit von Auslandstöchtern, die von 
deutschen multinationalen Konzernen gehalten werden. Dabei berücksichtigt die 
Untersuchung, ob es sich um eine direkte oder um eine indirekte Beteiligung handelt. Bei 
einer direkten Beteiligung investiert die deutsche Muttergesellschaft direkt in eine 
ausländische Tochtergesellschaft während bei einer indirekten Beteiligung mindestens eine 
dritte Unternehmenseinheit involviert ist. Die Auslandstochter wird dann über eine 
zwischengeschaltete Gesellschaft gehalten. Dies eröffnet zusätzliche Möglichkeiten zur 
Steuerplanung. Falls diese genutzt werden und indirekte Strukturen steuerlich motiviert sind, 
ändert sich dementsprechend auch der Charakter des steuerlichen Einflusses im Zielland. 
 
Die Studie zeigt zunächst anhand theoretischer Überlegungen, dass sich die Steuereffekte in 
der Tat unterscheiden, je nachdem, ob das Investitionsobjekt direkt oder indirekt gehalten 
wird. Zur empirischen Analyse werden Direktinvestitionsdaten der Bundesbank 
herangezogen. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen unsere theoretischen Vorhersagen: Der tarifliche 
Steuersatz des Ziellandes wirkt erwartungsgemäß negativ auf die Investitionstätigkeit. Im 
Falle der indirekten Investitionen wird dagegen zunächst ein positiver Effekt gefunden. 
Sobald jedoch auf die theoretisch relevanten Kapitalkosten kontrolliert wird, finden sich 
negative Steuereffekte für beide Beteiligungsmodelle. Dabei zeigt sich, dass eine Erhöhung 
der steuerlich relevanten Kapitalkosten die Investitionen bei indirekter Beteiligung deutlich 
stärker dämpft als bei einer direkten Beteiligung. Die empirische Analyse berücksichtigt 
dabei, dass die Wahl der Investitionsstruktur nicht zufällig erfolgt. Vielmehr kann diese 
Entscheidung durch beobachtbare Charakteristika des multinationalen Konzerns beschrieben 
werden. 
 
Die empirischen Ergebnisse legen darüber hinaus nahe, dass im Ausland generiertes 
Einkommen praktisch ohne steuerliche Belastung zurück zur deutschen Muttergesellschaft 
transferiert werden kann. Daraus könnte man folgern, dass indirekte Beteiligungsstrukturen 
den Steuerwettbewerb mildern. Allerdings beschränkt sich das Phänomen Steuerwettbewerb 
nicht nur auf eine Dimension. In der Tat könnte der Wettbewerb um Zwischen- oder 
Holdinggesellschaften gleichzeitig zunehmen. 
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1 Introduction
Economists agree that corporate taxation in°uences both the location choice and the in-
vestment decision of multinational ¯rms (for a survey, see De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003).
However, as companies become ever more international, another aspect is that multi-
national enterprises also ¯nd it increasingly easier to shift pro¯ts from high- to low-tax
jurisdictions. Di®erences in national tax systems and the complexity of the international
tax law open up additional opportunities to avoid taxes. This implies that multinationals
may set up sophisticated ¯rm structures to exploit tax-avoidance opportunities.
In this paper we analyze how taxes a®ect the a±liate-level investment decision of Ger-
man multinationals, taking into account that a signi¯cant share of outbound investments
are indirect rather than direct. While we consider direct investments as simple bilateral
structures (a parent company investing in a foreign a±liate), indirect strategies involve at
least three companies, where the parent is investing via a conduit or intermediate entity
in another foreign enterprise. Indirect investment structures possibly support multina-
tionals in reducing taxable income on a worldwide basis, because pro¯ts can be shifted
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1¯nancing structures allow payments to be channeled from a±liates to parent companies,
possibly without any tax deduction. Mintz (2004) shows in a theoretical model that the
analysis of investment decisions made by multinationals should explicitly di®er between
direct and indirect investment regimes. In contrast to the existing literature, this paper
follows this structural distinction and empirically con¯rms that tax e®ects indeed di®er:
while direct investments are negatively a®ected by the national statutory tax rates, indirect
investments are positively related to statutory tax rates in host countries. If we follow the-
oretical predictions and adjust tax wedges for indirect structures, we ¯nd adverse e®ects on
a±liate-level investment. The potential endogeneity of the structural choice (direct versus
indirect) is taken into account by a switching regression approach.
The empirical investigation is based on the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi),
a comprehensive dataset of all German outbound investment positions provided by the
Deutsche Bundesbank (the German central bank, see Lipponer, 2007). The current version
is available from 1996 to 2005 as panel data. The data provide information on companies'
balance-sheet positions and further characteristics, e.g. whether the investment is held
directly or indirectly.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general overview of direct and
indirect investment structures, including some descriptive statistics. In Section 3, we set
up a model that distinguishes between direct and indirect investments. Section 4 proposes
an empirical estimation approach. Subsequently, Section 5 provides information about the
data. Section 6 presents the empirical results, and Section 7 examines the sensitivity of
the results. Section 8 is the conclusion.
2Figure 1: Direct versus Indirect Investment Structure
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2 Direct versus Indirect Investment Structures
While the majority of foreign investments are direct, a considerable proportion of multina-
tional outbound activities are indirect. Figure 1 shows a stylized model which points out
that multinationals can, in principle, follow both investment regimes. Either the multi-
national decides to invest directly in the destination country (F) or it chooses an indirect
structure and establishes a conduit entity, possibly in a third country (C).1 The choice
of this organizational structure is presumably not random; it may depend on destination-
country characteristics, single ¯rm preferences or strategies, as well as on the company-
speci¯c potential.
Figure 2 presents the annual number of German outbound investments from 1996 to 2005.
There has been a signi¯cant increase in the number of investment objects in both regimes.
Moreover, focusing on indirect observations, the left panel of Figure 3 shows the three
1We mostly refer to `conduit' entities. This emphasizes that the ¯rm is in between the German parent
and the foreign subsidiary. Alternatively, we may refer to intermediate or holding companies.
3most important conduit locations for German multinationals. The Netherlands attract
more than a fourth of German conduit entities. Together with Switzerland and Austria,
these three countries host almost 60% of all German conduit entities. The right-hand side
of the bottom panel displays the three most important destination countries for indirect
structures. The observations are more evenly distributed across countries, and about one-
¯fth of German indirect outbound investment goes to Italy, France, and Spain.2
While this paper argues that di®erences in international taxation can explain why indi-
rect structures exist at all, the classical case of an indirect entity may be associated with
non-tax reasons. Indeed, headquarters or holding companies may provide services which
it is useful to bundle centrally for legal or e±ciency reasons. With regard to taxation,
Weichenrieder and Mintz (2006) identify three potential roles of conduit entities. First, a
conduit entity can be used for so-called treaty shopping, because some countries do o®er
preferential treatment with respect to withholding taxes.3 Second, conduit entities in low-
tax countries provide high-tax a±liates with intercompany loans. Borrowing from a±liates
located in low-tax countries and lending to a±liates in high-tax locations will allow the
latter to deduct interest payments from pro¯ts and save taxes. Under certain conditions,
this structure even allows for two interest deductions for one investment. Indeed, if an
indirect structure involves two high-tax countries, the multinational can gain twice.4 Fi-
2Note that this descriptive statistic (Figure 3) only considers three-country structures, i.e., structures
where the destination country is di®erent from the conduit country. If observations were included that
allow host and conduit country to be identical, the United States would have been an important host as
well as conduit country, because many US a±liates are held via US holding companies.
3Note that the conduit entity is not necessarily located in a third country. Some countries may provide
special tax treatment for some ¯rms, depending, for instance, on the legal form. The special treatment of
holdings in the Netherlands, ¯nancial holdings in Luxembourg, or headquarters of foreign multinationals
in Belgium (co-ordination centers) are well-known examples. Even a holding in the same country is then
possibly tax motivated. Pro¯t and loss consolidation, which is often allowed on a national basis only, can
also explain tax motivated conduit entities where no third country is involved (Weichenrieder and Mintz,
2006).
4This is called a double-dip structure. Some important tax attributes encourage this double-dip situa-
tion in the case of indirect investments (see Mintz, 2004). First, parent country and host country do not
limit interest deduction; second, the parent country exempts conduit income; third, the conduit country
allows for special tax treatment of intermediate companies or is a low-tax country; fourth, the conduit
country (the host country) imposes little or no withholding tax on income paid to the parent (conduit).
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6 6 Conduit-country observations
(In % of all indirect observations)
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Indirect three-country structures are the only structures considered, i.e., conduit countries are always di®erent from
host countries. The left panel shows the three most important conduit countries for German indirect outbound
investments (1996-2005). The Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria account for 56.76% of all observations. The right
side depicts the three most important destination countries for indirect investments (1996-2005). Italy, France, and
Spain account for 21.58% of all observations. Minority holdings, partnerships, and ¯nancial services are excluded.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, MiDi.
5nally, the low-tax conduit can reinvest income and defer any payments to the parent. This
last point is especially relevant for outbound investments from countries using a tax credit
system. However, income deferral of passive income may collide with controlled foreign
company (CFC) rules, depending on the type of income (for further information about
the US Subpart F legislation, see Hines, 1999; Weichenrieder, 1996, for the German rule).
Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003) con¯rm that tax deferral is an important strategy for US
multinationals, because of the US tax system.5 They show that indirectly owned a±liates
are more sensitive to foreign tax-rate di®erences, because chains of ownership can mitigate
the e®ects of the US foreign tax credit system by expanding opportunities to defer US
tax liabilities. Incentives under ownership chains are then comparable to incentives under
exemption systems, because multinationals can avoid repatriation taxes.
3 Theoretical Analysis
Consider a German multinational enterprise. The company is active in Germany (G) and
in a foreign location (F). Production is determined by a concave production function with
standard properties, where fG(KG) denotes production in Germany, and fF(FF) denotes
production in the foreign country.6 We abstract from other input factors such as labor. The
model follows the analysis of Mintz (2004) and distinguishes two regimes, where regime I
(II) is the direct (indirect) investment regime.
5The US system is called a tax credit system. It taxes companies on their worldwide income, irrespective
of where it was earned. Afterwards, to avoid double taxation, a company receives a credit for the taxes it
paid to a foreign government up to the amount it would have paid had it remained in the US. In contrast,
the method used by Germany and other countries is called a territorial or exemption system. Here, only
pro¯ts earned in the home country are taxed.
6f0(¢) > 0;f00(¢) < 0.
63.1 Direct Structure (Regime I)
Pro¯ts are determined by output, fG(KG) and fF(KF). Both countries, Germany and
the foreign country, tax pro¯ts at rates of ¿G and ¿F, respectively. There is no di®erence
between interest rates in the model. We further assume that foreign-source income is tax
exempt.7 Moreover, we abstract from depreciation allowances and any other taxes (e.g.,
withholding taxes). Overall pro¯ts of the multinational (home and foreign pro¯ts) are
given by
¼ = (1 ¡ ¿G)(fG(KG) ¡ iBG) + iEF (1)
+ (1 ¡ ¿F)(fF(KF) ¡ iBF) ¡ iEF:
The ¯rst line captures the pro¯ts of the German parent company. BG refers to external
debt ¯nance. Accordingly, interest expenses iBG are deductible from the tax base. Note
that we abstract from opportunity costs for own capital iEG. We may, however, de¯ne
pro¯ts inclusive of iEG. The second line refers to the pro¯ts of the foreign a±liate. The
a±liate in F can ¯nance with local debt BF or with parent equity EF. The parent receives
dividends iEF without tax deduction. We keep EF in the model|albeit it would cancel
out in this ¯rst case|because it emphasizes one crucial di®erence compared to the indirect
structure (see below). The ¯rm maximizes pro¯ts subject to the following constraints:
KG + EF = BG,
KF = EF + BF,
BG ¸ 0, BF ¸ 0.
Note that the ¯rst constraint implies that the parent also raises funds to ¯nance the for-
eign a±liate; actually more than necessary for its own investment KG. We further impose
nonnegativity constraints on BG and BF. Another assumption is that the host-country tax
7Germany basically exempts foreign earnings from domestic taxation.
7rate is always lower than the home-country tax rate (¿G > ¿F). If we maximize the model









The ¯rst optimality condition points out that the decision of the parent company is not
distorted. Abstracting from i, we refer to the second expression as the tax related cost of
capital or the tax wedge.8 If we assume that the German tax rate always exceeds the foreign
tax rate, new investment is exclusively parent-debt ¯nanced.9 The equity transfer to the
a±liate, therefore, is re¯nanced with external debt. Assuming that the parent's pro¯ts
are positive (the parent is not tax-exhaust), overall pro¯ts of the multinational enterprise
are maximized. While the optimality condition for the German part of the multinational
implies tax neutrality, the required rate of return for the foreign investment is below i,
because of simple tax arbitrage.
For a variation in the foreign statutory tax rate, we obtain the comparative static e®ect








8The term tax wedge simply re°ects that the optimality condition is distorted, i.e. f0(KF) 6= i. The
tax wedge in the case of the foreign a±liate implies a reduction of the cost of capital.
9We obtain this extreme result|complete debt ¯nance|because we do not introduce any costs asso-
ciated with debt (and because ¿G > ¿F). While these costs are neglected in this model, the corporate
¯nance literature refers to concepts where debt ¯nance is associated with additional costs (for surveys, see
Myers, 2001; Graham, 2003).
83.2 Indirect Structure (Regime II)
We rely on one structural di®erence when introducing the conduit structure: the parent
company still transfers equity funds to a foreign a±liate, but now to the conduit entity.
Subsequently, the conduit provides the foreign a±liate F with internal debt. The meaning
of the above notation slightly changes: EF now refers to an internal credit if we consider
the foreign a±liate; it refers to equity if we consider the parent ¯rm. Any further activity
of the conduit is not modeled, because we are only interested in investment activities of
the a±liate F. The multinational's pro¯ts are determined by
¼ = (1 ¡ ¿G)(fG(KG) ¡ iBG) + iEF (2)
+ (1 ¡ ¿F)(fF(KF) ¡ iBF ¡ iEF):
We assume that transfers, including interest payments to the conduit, can be channeled
from the a±liate to the parent without any tax deduction. The model then describes the
so-called double-dip structure, because the multinational can deduct interest payments in
the host country and in the home country.10 We maximize the model subject to the above





(1 ¡ ¿G ¡ ¿F)
(1 ¡ ¿F)
:
The foreign a±liate's cost of capital are further reduced, because of the additional interest







10Intuitively, the German parent takes up more capital than necessary to ¯nance its own investment.
Interest expenses in Germany are deductible for corporate tax purposes. The foreign a±liate is internal
debt ¯nanced, and associated interest expenses are again deductible. Hence we have two interest deductions
for the same investment.
9The prediction of a positive tax e®ect is the result of the double-dip interest deduction,
because a higher foreign tax rate implies that interest deductions are even more valuable.
3.3 Indirect Structure (Extended)
We extend the indirect model with respect to one critical assumption. While equation (2)
implies that interest payments received by the conduit are tax exempt, we introduce a tax
¿C on interest payments to the conduit. Pro¯ts can then be written as
¼ = (1 ¡ ¿G)(fG(KG) ¡ iBG) + iEF (3)
+ (1 ¡ ¿F)(fF(KF) ¡ iBF ¡ iEF) ¡ ¿CiEF:
¿C may denote withholding taxes as well as the conduit-country tax rate. The marginal
decision is then determined by
f
0(KF) = i
(1 ¡ ¿G ¡ (¿F ¡ ¿C))
(1 ¡ ¿F)
:
There is no longer any tax advantage compared to the direct structure if ¿F equals ¿C. If
¿C < ¿F, the tax wedge ranges somewhere between the direct and the indirect solution.
To sum up, theory suggests two di®erent regimes with two (three) di®erent measures for












(1 ¡ ¿G ¡ ¿F + ¿C)
(1 ¡ ¿F)
: (6)
10T1 applies to the direct structure (Regime I), T2 is the relevant tax measure for the indirect
structure (Regime II), and T ¤
2 relates to the extended indirect structure, where ¿C is also
considered.
4 Investigation Approach
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to estimate a±liate-level investment. The theoret-
ical analysis suggests two di®erent regimes, depending on whether investments are direct or
indirect. One way to approach this problem is to consider direct and indirect investments
as two separate samples, simply split observations, and estimate two distinct equations.
However, ¯rms do not randomly choose one or the other regime, and a simple split does
not fully account for this endogeneity.11
To address this endogeneity problem we follow the literature and estimate an endogenous
switching regression model, where the switching rule is observed (Lee, 1978). Maddala
(1983) suggests a two-step procedure: ¯rst, estimate the binary variable I, indicating
whether the investment is directly or indirectly held. Subsequently, estimate a±liate in-
vestment in a second stage and condition on the regime choice.
From a taxation perspective, conduit structures should generally be dominant, empirically.
11We can think of endogeneity in this context in many di®erent ways. First, there are some ¯rms switch-
ing from one regime to the other. The ultimate regression sample contains exactly 50 a±liates switching
at least once over the whole time span. Firms switching and immediately switching back, however, do
not contribute new information if they come up as single observations in the panel data regressions with
a±liate-speci¯c e®ects. Second, ¯rms' potentials to cushion shocks di®er, depending on the regime. Hence,
the regime is correlated with these shocks. Third, the variable of interest, a±liate investment, may also
di®er structurally with respect to all control variables. Fourth, regime choice and investment level may be
simultaneously determined.
Another intuitive way to think about endogeneity is to look at the decision to set up an indirect structure.
The existence of preferential tax treatments, or generally di®erences in international taxation, presumably
distort the decision to set up a conduit structure. If the heterogeneity in multinationals' potentials ulti-
mately determines the regime, we have a problem of self selection, or selection into the regime.
Any ¯xed-e®ects approach may account for time-invariant preferences (e.g., Vella, 1998). Yet the proclivity
of multinationals to choose a speci¯c regime can vary over time.
11However, descriptive statistics show that the majority of investments are direct. It is cer-
tainly true that indirect structures can be e±cient, but they are also costly. While every
foreign activity is associated with costs (e.g., Markusen, 1995), a conduit entity involves
additional control and information problems, and hence, additional costs which reduce the
probability to choose the indirect structure. We summarize the decision to establish a











Iijkt is a binary variable indicating whether the multinational j is investing in country
k at time t in an a±liate i via a conduit entity or not. IND¤
ijkt is the corresponding
unobserved propensity and cijkt represents the company-speci¯c costs associated with the
conduit ¯rm. These costs are determined by a±liate and company-group variables and
also by host-location factors, e.g. the host-country tax rate ¿kt. Hence, a vector Xijkt
of observable host-country characteristics as well as a±liate- and company-group-speci¯c
characteristics determines costs. Finally, °i captures unobserved preferences of a±liates,
which may be important, for instance, because of a±liate-speci¯c management strategies.
First-step estimation equations are then speci¯ed as
Iijkt = a1BSTjt + a2PROjt + a4Xijkt + »t + °i + u
I
ijkt: (7)
The respective regime choice is determined by the company-group speci¯c variables BSTjt
and PROjt, which re°ect the group-speci¯c ability, and also preference, as regards es-
tablishing a conduit entity. BSTjt is the balance-sheet total of the multinational group;
PROjt refers to the pro¯tability of the multinational.12 Moreover, all relevant second-
12For further data and variable de¯nitions see Section 5 and the Appendix. Note that empirical identi-
12stage explanatory variables are included. From ¯rst-stage regressions we obtain estimates
for an additional selection term ^ ¸. Including ^ ¸ in the equations of interest allows us to
consistently estimate
Regime 1: Y1;ijkt = ®1 + ®2T1;kt + ®3Xijkt + ^ ¸1;ijkt + Ãt + 'i + ²1;ijkt i® Iijkt = 1;
Regime 2: Y2;ijkt = ¯1 + ¯2T2;kt + ¯3Xijkt + ^ ¸2;ijkt + Ãt + 'i + ²2;ijkt i® Iijkt = 0:
Y denotes a±liate-level investment. Xijkt is a vector of a±liate- and country-speci¯c control





1¡©(X^ a), as additional regressors (Maddala, 1983).13 Finally, T1 and T2 are the
tax-related cost of capital for direct and indirect structures as de¯ned in (4) and (5),
respectively.
The empirical implementation of this two-step approach in context of panel data and
unobserved heterogeneity in both equations requires further considerations. We follow the
procedure suggested by Wooldridge (1995) for panel data selection models.14
¯cation requires at least one variable that explains the regime choice. We may refer to this variable as an
instrument. The nonlinearity of the probability model can already be su±cient to identify the regime. Yet
this can cause collinearity among regressors since we condition on the regime choice in the second stage
(Wooldridge, 2002). Note also that we do not aim to explain which countries are preferable conduit-entity
locations. Rather, we are interested in the multinational's regime choice, i.e., the ¯rst-stage decision to
establish a conduit structure at all, where the company can choose any potential conduit location.
13Á denotes the standard normal density function, © the distribution function. The ratio (
Á(X^ a)
©(X^ a)) is also
known as the inverse Mills ratio.
14The Appendix contains further details concerning the Wooldridge (1995) estimator and, especially,
the procedure for correcting standard errors.
135 Data and Descriptive Statistics
For the empirical analysis, we use the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) provided
by the Deutsche Bundesbank. This is an a±liate-level database of German multinationals'
foreign investments. The data provide information about the investment object's balance
sheet, including further information on the type of investment and on the investor. A fa-
vorable aspect of the data is that the current version provides a±liate-level panel data for
the period 1996 to 2005. Moreover, data collection is enforced by German law, which sets
reporting obligations for certain international transactions and positions.15 As a crucial
variable for this analysis, MiDi includes the information on whether the German multina-
tional invests directly or indirectly via a conduit entity.
Below regressions analyze the determinants of a±liate-level investment. Investment is
de¯ned as the logarithmic di®erence in the balance-sheet item `¯xed assets'. While we
can also interpret this variable as a growth rate, we mostly refer to `investment' in the
following. Explanatory variables are tax wedges T as de¯ned above. This variable is
expected to be negatively related to a±liate-level investment. In order to control for
country characteristics, we employ the local GDP, local labor cost in manufacturing, and
the local lending rate.16 Furthermore, we control for the present value of depreciation
allowances de¯ned by the countries' tax code. Besides, we condition on the a±liate-speci¯c
variables sales and loss carryforward. We expect a positive sign for sales, because this is
an indicator for the a±liate's size and cash °ow. The dummy variable loss carryforward
indicates whether some loss carryforward is reported. The existence of losses in the previous
periods may capture characteristics of the current decision problem of the company such
15Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation) in connection with Aussen-
wirtschaftsverordnung (Foreign Trade and Payment Regulations). Each German multinational has to
report its foreign assets including both direct and indirect FDI, conditional on some lower threshold level
for mandatory reporting. Since 2002, investments have to be reported if the participation is 10% or more
and the balance-sheet total of the foreign object is above 3 million euros. Though previous years showed
lower thresholds, this level is uniformly applied for all years in the panel. For details see Lipponer (2007).
16MiDi does not provide information on a±liate-speci¯c labor costs, or interest payments, etc.
14as the expected performance of an a±liate. Loss carryforward is expected to be negatively
related to investment.
Table 1 summarizes all relevant regression variables and respective mean values. The esti-
mation sample is restricted to majority holdings. Moreover, ¯nancial services, partnerships,
and nonproductive observations are excluded (see the Appendix for a detailed classi¯ca-
tion). According to theory, we remove observations if the German tax rate is below the
statutory tax rate of the destination country.17 Tax wedges are de¯ned according to equa-
tions (4), (5), and (6). Since withholding taxes are often negotiated in double tax treaties,
the withholding tax rate ¿C depends on the location of the conduit entity and potential
treaties of host countries with conduit countries.18 To check the sensitivity of the analysis,
we further de¯ne T ¤
2a, T ¤
2b, and T ¤
2c, where we set ¿C at 10%, 20%, and 25%, respectively,
for all observations (see also Section 7). The consideration for this is that we change the
composition of the sample, because the maximization problem in Section 3.3 requires that
¿C is below the host-country tax rate. If this condition is not ful¯lled, the observation
is removed. Additionally, we change the variation of the nonlinear tax wedge. Whereas
tax wedges di®er by construction, a comparison of other variables' mean values already
indicate structural di®erences. As we would expect, the mean statutory tax rate is higher
in Regime II. Market size, re°ected by GDP, is on average twice as high in Regime II.
Moreover, investments are much bigger in the case of the indirect structures|in terms of
¯xed assets and also in terms of sales. Another aspect is that labor costs di®er on average.
One may speculate whether this indicates that direct investments are also predominantly
vertical FDI.
17The relevant German statutory tax rate is adjusted for the non-deductibility of interest expenses,
because this is the relevant measure for this basic arbitrage condition.
18Withholding tax rates on interest payments refer to 2005.
15Table 1: Variable Description
Mean Values
(Standard Errors)
Regime I Regime II
Statutory Tax Rate .308 .327
(.073) (.072)


























Country GDP (in US$ bill.) 951 1,790
(1,993) (2,839)
Labor Cost (in US$) 13.79 16.89
(8.78) (7.55)
Lending Rate .076 .066
(.046) (.034)














Fixed Assets (in e mill.) 15.62 27.22
(86.93) (133.26)
Sales (in e mill.) 55.50 91.42
(255.17) (434.64)















A±liate-level data are taken from MiDi (see Lipponer, 2007). Corporate tax-
ation data are taken from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
(IBFD), and from tax surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC, and KPMG.
The lending rates refer to credits to the private sector and are taken from the
IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2006) augmented with corre-
sponding OECD ¯gures. GDP in U.S. dollars, nominal, is taken from World
Bank World Development Indicators (2006). Hourly labor costs in U.S. dollars
for production workers in manufacturing are taken from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics and Eurostat. T1 and T2 refer to (4) and (5). T¤
2 refers to
equation (6), where ¿C corresponds to the relevant withholding tax rate for
interest payments. ¿C is equal to 10% (T¤
2a), 20% (T¤
2b), and 25% (T¤
2c) for all
observations. Di®erent sample size: (b) 5,554 observations, (c) 5,030 observa-
tions.
166 Regression Analysis
First regression results, where we simply split the sample and estimate the respective
regimes, are reported in Table 2. As expected, we ¯nd a negative impact of the statutory
tax rate and of the tax wedge on direct investments. While we partially con¯rm theory by
¯nding a positive, but not signi¯cant, tax rate e®ect on indirect investments, we con¯rm the
negative e®ect of the tax wedge as de¯ned in equation (5) (column (4)). We additionally
include control variables such as the a±liate-speci¯c sales, or the dummy variable for
the loss carryforward. Both a±liate-speci¯c variables show the expected sign, and the
negative loss carryforward is also signi¯cant. The ¯xed e®ects approach removes all cross-
section variation between a±liates and also nests country ¯xed e®ects. In this sense, it
is not surprising that country-speci¯c variables, for example local GDP or labor cost,
are statistically insigni¯cant. We ¯nd, however, a signi¯cant positive e®ect of the local
lending rate for some speci¯cations. The positive coe±cient may re°ect the comparative
advantage of multinationals compared to domestic ¯rms, because multinationals can rely on
internal capital markets. According to the model in Section 3, external lending conditions
in Germany are relevant. We control for the variation of German lending conditions by
including a full set of time dummies. Thereby, we also capture general taxing conditions
in Germany which are the same for all German parent ¯rms.
Since we condition on a±liate-speci¯c e®ects in this sample split, estimates are consistent
if sample selection|the choice of the regime|depends on the constant a±liate-speci¯c
component (e.g., Vella, 1998). If this a±liate-speci¯c e®ect does not fully capture selection,
or if the selection e®ect varies over time, our estimates are not consistent. Table 3 reports
the results from switching regressions, where we additionally condition on the selection
e®ect ^ ¸.19 Basically, the results con¯rm ¯ndings in Table 2. The positive tax rate e®ect for
19See the Appendix for the ¯rst-stage regression results and interpretation. Results are robust with
respect to the inclusion of regime-identifying variables. However, all regressions in Table 3 use speci¯cation
(2) from Table 6 for identi¯cation.
17Table 2: Direct and Indirect Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Statutory Tax Rate -.533¤ .828
(.285) (.580)
Tax Wedge (T1) -.448¤
(.249)





(log) Sales .030 .046 .030 .046 .046
(.020) (.050) (.020) (.050) (.050)
Loss Carryforward -.034¤¤ -.060¤ -.034¤¤ -.059¤ -.059¤
(.016) (.035) (.016) (.035) (.035)
(log) GDP -.200 .031 -.218 .004 .056
(.201) (.118) (.200) (.120) (.125)
(log) Labor Cost .027 -.210 .035 -.188 -.231
(.199) (.197) (.198) (.200) (.201)
(log) Lending Rate .107¤¤¤ .079 .108¤¤¤ .083 .095
(.042) (.064) (.042) (.061) (.061)
Present Value Depr. -.140 .024 -.140 .007 .015
(.229) (.559) (.233) (.565) (.546)
Regime I II I II II
Firms 3,377 1,627 3,377 1,627 1,627
Observations 14,487 5,949 14,487 5,949 5,949
Host Countries 32 33 32 33 33
Dependent variable is investment, de¯ned as the logarithmic di®erence in the balance-
sheet position ¯xed assets. Time and a±liate-level ¯xed e®ects are included but not
reported. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust and clustered (year-country cell).
(***) (**) (*) indicate signi¯cance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level. T1 is de¯ned according
to equation (4). T2 follows (5). T¤
2 corresponds to equation (6).
the indirect investments is now signi¯cant. The estimated coe±cient in column (3) implies
that a 1 percentage point higher tax wedge is associated with -.38% less new investment
in ¯xed assets. The regression in column 4 suggests that a 1 percentage point higher
indirect tax wedge is associated with -.99% less new investment. The results con¯rm that
the double-dip structure is relevant, because T2 is calculated accordingly. In a further
step, we consider that host countries possibly impose withholding taxes. T ¤
2 now refers to
18Table 3: Direct and Indirect Investment (Switching Regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Statutory Tax Rate -.450¤¤ .900¤
(.229) (.530)
Tax Wedge (T1) -.383¤
(.210)





(log) Sales .029 .044 .030 .044 .043
(.019) (.055) (.019) (.055) (.055)
Loss Carryforward -.035¤¤ -.060 -.035¤¤ -.059 -.059
(.016) (.038) (.016) (.038) (.038)
(log) GDP -.233¤ .027 -.248¤ -.001 .052
(.133) (.097) (.135) (.157) (.146)
(log) Labor Cost .043 -.254 .050 -.233 -.274¤
(.129) (.163) (.136) (.167) (.165)
(log) Lending Rate .111¤¤¤ .075 .112¤¤¤ .080 .091
(.029) (.056) (.030) (.101) (.097)
Present Value Depr. -.109 .059 -.113 .042 .045
(.187) (.530) (.195) (1.21) (1.11)
Regime I II I II II
Firms 3,377 1,627 3,377 1,627 1,627
Observations 14,487 5,949 14,487 5,949 5,949
Host Countries 32 33 32 33 33
Dependent variable is investment, de¯ned as the logarithmic di®erence in the balance-
sheet position ¯xed assets. Time dummies and linearized a±liate-level ¯xed e®ects are
included but not reported. All estimations take into account the endogeneity of the
regime choice. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust for any form of heteroscedas-
ticity and autocorrelation, and account for the two-step estimation (Wooldridge, 1995).
(***) (**) (*) indicate signi¯cance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level. All reported results re-
fer to speci¯cation (2) of the probit equation (see the Appendix). T1 is de¯ned according
to equation (4). T2 follows (5). T¤
2 corresponds to (6).
equation (6), where ¿C corresponds to the bilateral withholding tax for interest payments
between the host country and the conduit country. The insigni¯cant coe±cient in column
(5) may indicate that multinationals can avoid withholding taxes, for example, by using
sophisticated conduit chains, or by bene¯ting from favorable tax treatment.
19Table 4 summarizes the estimated selection e®ects (speci¯cations refer to columns (1) and
(2) of Table 3). A test on the joint signi¯cance of the 9 selection terms con¯rms a bias for
both samples. There is no well-de¯ned expectation about the sign of the selection variables.
Selection can basically depend on the general economic environment, for example cyclical
°uctuations, and how multinationals are able to cope with it; and this can vary over time.
We estimate a signi¯cant positive e®ect for most years of the direct sample. This is,
intuitively, what we would expect: a higher probability to invest directly implies less new
investment. Yet the ¯ndings for the indirect sample are ambiguous.
Table 4: Selection Tests
Regime I Regime II
Selection 1997 .405¤ -1.17¤¤
(.249) (.571)
Selection 1998 -.011 -.030
(.020) (.055)
Selection 1999 -.001 .005
(.019) (.042)
Selection 2000 .372¤ .410
(.209) (.550)
Selection 2001 -.085 .227
(.130) (.165)
Selection 2002 .247¤ -.012
(.133) (.097)
Selection 2003 -.059¤ -.018
(.032) (.058)
Selection 2004 .145 .236
(.096) (.194)






Selection variables (^ ¸) are obtained from ¯rst-stage esti-
mates. Coe±cients refer to speci¯cations (1) and (2) in Ta-
ble 3. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust for any
form of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, and account
for the two-step estimation (see Wooldridge, 1995). (***)
(**) (*) indicate signi¯cance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level.
207 Sensitivity Analysis
Finally, we test the robustness of the regression analysis. Table 5 shows estimations for
both regimes. Columns (1) and (4) refer to 27 European Union (EU) member countries.
Columns (2) and (5) refer to the EU 15. The reason for this sample restriction is that we
possibly cannot capture relevant withholding tax rates, because conduit chains are complex
and income is channeled through di®erent conduit countries. Moreover, there is preferential
tax treatment for some ¯rms in many countries. Preferential tax treatment depends, for
instance, on the legal form of the a±liate. If we restrict countries on the European Union,
however, we can test the robustness of the ¯ndings, because the EU parent-subsidiary
directive, the EU interest and royalties directive, and existing double-tax treaties often
rule out withholding taxes. All results from above regressions are con¯rmed in Table 5.
In a next step, we only analyze a±liates from the manufacturing sector (columns (3) and
(6)). Findings are also robust with respect to this sample restriction. Finally, columns (7),
(8), and (9) employ tax wedges, where the tax rate ¿C equals 10%, 20%, and 25%, for all
observations. This changes the variation of the nonlinear tax term, and imposes a further
restriction on the sample. Accordingly, all observations are removed where the host tax
rate is above 10%, 20%, or 25% (the maximization problem in Section 3.3 requires that the
host-country tax rate is higher than taxation in the conduit country). All ¯ndings con¯rm
the negative tax wedge e®ect, but the last speci¯cation is no longer signi¯cant.
8 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the a±liate-level investment decision of German multination-
als. A theoretical model yields di®erent corporate tax e®ects, depending on whether the
multinational follows a direct or an indirect investment strategy. According to theory, we











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22ent regimes. This approach allows us to control for the endogeneity of the regime choice.
The empirical results con¯rm theoretical predictions: corporate tax e®ects are negative for
direct investments, but positive for indirect observations. Tax related costs of capital are
con¯rmed to be negatively related to investment in both regimes. In particular, according
to speci¯cations (3) and (4) in Table 3, we ¯nd a semi-elasticity of -.38 for direct and -.99
for indirect investments.
The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that income can be transferred to the
German parent without any tax deduction. This may be reasonable, given that many
conditions promoting the double-dip structure are ful¯lled. First, Germany is a high-tax
country (in the empirical analysis we drop all observations where the German tax rate is
below the tax rate of the foreign a±liate). Second, Germany exempts dividend income
almost completely. Third, the major conduit countries (see Section 2) are well-known
conduit locations, often with preferential tax regimes.20 Fourth, real conduit structures
can be more complicated. Indeed, indirect structures often involve not only one conduit
entity, but complex multi-country ownership chains. This opens up extensive ¯nancing
opportunities and opportunities to repatriate pro¯ts untaxed (treaty shopping).
One remarkable aspect of the ¯ndings is the implication for tax competition: the existence
of conduit structures and low-tax conduit countries reduces the downward pressure on tax
rates. One may speculate whether this explains why some countries can stick to higher
taxes. We should, however, interpret this conclusion with considerable caution, because
tax competition is a phenomenon which is not con¯ned to one speci¯c aspect. In fact, tax
competition for conduit entities may well be intensi¯ed.
20Special tax regimes often apply to holding companies (e.g., in Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
UK). In some cases, tax rates are even negotiable. Tax authorities and single ¯rms agree on special
arrangements for certain time periods, which have to be renegotiated afterwards.
23Appendix A: Selection Correction for Panel Data Mod-
els under Conditional Mean Independence Assumption
Wooldridge (1995) suggests a °exible two-stage regression approach to correct for sample
selection bias in panel data models. We apply his estimation strategy on the above switch-
ing regression model, which allows us to perform robust statistical inference. Appendix
A summarizes the main points of the estimator, with an emphasis on standard error cor-
rection. For details and consistency proofs, please consult the Wooldridge (1995) paper.
The estimator allows for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved e®ects (°i;'i) and
observable explanatory variables.21 Furthermore, the error distribution in the second-stage
equation remains unspeci¯ed; the idiosyncratic errors can be arbitrarily serially dependent
and can have any form of heterogeneity.
We proceed with a version of the above switching regression model, where we slightly
change notations for simplicity and stick closer to Wooldridge (1995). We start the analysis
by ¯rst estimating a probit model
P(Iit = 1jxi) = ©(xi±t): (8)
Equation (8) is estimated by standard probit techniques,22 however for each time period.
Subsequently, we obtain estimates for the selection terms, ^ ¸1;i = Á(xi^ ±t)=©(xi^ ±t) and ^ ¸2;i =
Á(xi^ ±t)=(1 ¡ ©(xi^ ±t)), which are then included as control variables in the second-stage
regressions (Maddala, 1983).
Regime 1: y1;it = µ1^ w1;it + u1;it i® I = 1: (9)
21An important part of the variation in y is explained by unobserved heterogeneity between ¯rms. This
unobserved e®ect is likely to be correlated with other control variables. Hence, consistent coe±cients
require a ¯xed e®ects approach.
22(x) is a vector of control variables, including all second-stage regressors and also some additional
regime-identifying variables.
24Regime 2: y2;it = µ2^ w2;it + u2;it i® I = 0: (10)
Here, ^ w is de¯ned as ^ wR;it = (1;xR;it;xi;0;:::;0; ^ ¸R;it;0;:::;0), for R = 1,2. Note that we
additionally include the estimated probability terms ^ ¸R(R = 1;2) from ¯rst-stage regres-
sions and also ¯rm-speci¯c means to control for unobserved heterogeneity.23 Subsequently,
we obtain the coe±cient vector µR(R = 1;2) from a pooled OLS regression:















R;it^ yR;it); R = 1;2:
Finally, we have to account for the two-stage estimation procedure. We obtain Avar(^ µ) by
¯rst de¯ning OLS residuals, ^ eR;it ´ yit ¡ ^ wit^ µ for Rit = 1,2; i = 1,...,N; t = 1,..., T. To
estimate Avar(^ µ), we further de¯ne ^ D:










RGR;it for R = 1;2; (11)




0 0 ::: 0 0 ::: 0




The matrix Zit is Zit = (0000:::00 ^ vitxi 00:::00)0. ^ vit is the derivative of ¸(¢) evaluated at xi^ ±t.
For simplicity, we continue without the regime identi¯er R and estimate Avar(^ µ) for the
23Following Wooldridge (1995), we linearize the unobserved e®ects according to the Chamberlain (1980,
1982) method, who suggests to include all leads and lags of explanatory variables in order to model the
relationship between the unobserved e®ect and the exogenous variables. To save degrees of freedom,
however, we apply the Mundlak (1978) approach that imposes time-constant coe±cients and include mean
values of explanatory variables (xi).
25respective regime. To obtain Avar(^ µ) as ^ A¡1^ B^ A¡1=N, we further de¯ne






















it^ eit; i = 1;:::;N; (16)











where r±^ xit(^ ±)0 is the gradient of ^ xit(^ ±)0, evaluated at ^ ±; ^ rit is de¯ned for each t as minus
the inverse of the average estimated Hessian times the estimated score of the probit log-
likelihood function for observation i, where we use the standard results for the ¯rst- and
second derivatives for the probit model (e.g. Maddala, 1983). Finally, we estimate Avar(^ µ)
as ^ A¡1^ B^ A¡1=N and obtain valid standard errors.
Appendix B: First-Stage Regression Results
The empirical analysis follows Maddala (1983), who suggests a two-stage method for es-
timating the switching regression model. The ¯rst-stage regression is concerned with the
estimation of a probit model, where group-speci¯c variables can identify the respective
regime. The results for pooled probit regressions are reported in Table 6.24 All coe±cients
are in line with theoretical considerations. A higher balance-sheet total of the whole com-
pany group is associated with a higher probability of setting up an indirect structure. We
may speculate whether these companies have the required expertise to do so. The procliv-
24Note that we follow Wooldridge (1995) and estimate probits for single years t to obtain ^ ¸.
26ity to think in terms of tax planning may also be higher considering big multinationals. All
regression results in Tables 3 to 5 are reported according to speci¯cation (2), where another
identifying variable is included.25 The ¯ndings indicate that a higher pro¯tability of the
company group is associated with a higher propensity to invest indirectly.26 We argue that
both the balance-sheet total and the pro¯tability on the multinational-group level are valid
identifying variables. While the second-stage regressions consider a±liate-level variation,
where we also control for a±liate-speci¯c heterogeneity, the balance-sheet total and the
pro¯tability vary at the group level. If we were considering variation between countries|
we actually remove it by conditioning on a±liate-speci¯c heterogeneity|we would also
expect the local tax rate to be a crucial determinant.
To sum up, the estimations suggests that, after conditioning on a±liate-speci¯c hetero-
geneity, company-speci¯c variables are the only relevant factors a®ecting the choice of the
regime.
25Speci¯cation tests indicate that results are robust, irrespective of whether speci¯cation (1) or (2) is
used.
26Pro¯tability is de¯ned as total pro¯ts of the multinational (after taxes, prior to pro¯t distribution,
and o®setting of losses carried forward), relative to the balance-sheet total of the group.
27Table 6: Regime Identification
(1) (2)








Loss Carryforward .008 .008
(.017) (.017)
(log) GDP -.075 -.072
(.113) (.113)
(log) Labor Cost -.030 -.032
(.134) (.134)
(log) Lending Rate .002 .002
(.034) (.034)




Dependent variable is the binary indicator for direct/indirect
(1/0) investment. Probit estimation including time-speci¯c ef-
fects and linearized unobserved a±liate-speci¯c e®ects. Robust
standard errors (in parentheses). (***) (**) (*) indicate signi¯-
cance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level. Balance-sheet Total is the
annual aggregate at group level. Pro¯tability is the pro¯tability
of the multinational group, de¯ned as total pro¯ts of the multi-
national (after taxes, prior to pro¯t distribution, and o®setting of
losses carried forward), relative to the balance-sheet total of the
company group.
28Table 7: Data Sources, Variable Descriptions, Sample Restrictions
Firm-level Data Source: Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi),
Deutsche Bundesbank (see Lipponer, 2007).
De¯nition: Investment is the logarithmic di®erence
in the balance-sheet item ¯xed assets.
Corporate Tax Rates Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD),
tax surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC, and KPMG.
De¯nition: Statutory Corporate Tax Rates.
Withholding Tax Rates Source: Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide provided by Ernst&Young.
Withholding tax rates refer to 2005.
De¯nition: Withholding taxes on interest payments.
GDP Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (2006).
De¯nition: Gross domestic product in U.S. dollars, nominal.
Labor Cost Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Eurostat.
De¯nition: Hourly compensation costs in U.S. dollars
for production workers in manufacturing.
Lending Rate Source: IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2006),
augmented with corresponding OECD ¯gures.
De¯nition: Interest rate for credits to the private sector.
Present values of Source: Depreciation rules from above tax-data references
depreciation allowances De¯nition: Calculated for investments in machinery,
discount rate 7.1 percent.
Sample Restrictions According to the model, we drop all observations where the German
statutory tax rate is below the foreign statutory tax rate, ¿G < ¿F.
Tax rates account for the non-deductibility of interest expenses with
respect to the German local business tax.
Minority holdings and partnerships are excluded, as well as the following
non-producing sectors: education, health, veterinary and social care,
¯nancial services, holding companies, other services, recreational,
cultural and sporting activities, retail and wholesale trade, real
estate and renting, research and development, telecommunication
and post, private households with employees activities of other
membership organizations, nonpro¯t organizations serving households,
general government, sewage and refuse disposal, compulsory social
security, agriculture, hunting and forestry (see Lipponer, 2007).
Note that restrictions do not apply on Fig. 2 and 3.
Sensitivity Analysis Table 5 refers to the following sample de¯nitions:
Sample 1 (2): only EU 27 (EU 15) member countries
Sample 3: only manufacturing industries (see Lipponer, 2007)
Sample 4: sets ¿C at 10% for all observations. The basic arbi-
trage condition then requires that host-country tax
rates are higher than 10%
Sample 5: sets ¿C at 20% for all observations. The basic arbi-
trage condition then requires that host-country tax
rates are higher than 20%
Sample 6: sets ¿C at 25% for all observations. The basic arbi-
trage condition then requires that host-country tax
rates are higher than 25%
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